1914年，英国有意在英属印度和俄罗斯/中国之间建立一个独立的西藏缓冲地带—“Quter Tibet”。最后，英属印度外交部长亨利.麦克马洪先生邀请西藏和中国代表前往印度的西姆拉。西藏由于急于独立，拥有自己的外交权利（而不是通过中国来与外国接触），于是便承认对拉萨势力范围的划分—麦克马洪线—把达旺割让给了英属印度，让其获利不少。
However, the Simla Agreement was negotiated between the Tibetan and British representatives in a provisional sort of way after the Chinese representatives had packed up and left. Since Britain’s Foreign Office was protective of its China diplomacy and not interested in encouraging Tibetan pretensions to negotiate as an independent sovereign power, the absence of the Chinese representatives—and a Chinese endorsement of the border arrangement accepted by the Tibetan authorities–was a deal breaker.
但是西姆拉协定是西藏方面和英国在中国代表离开后临时签订的。由于当时英国对中国的保护性政策因此不鼓励西藏寻求独立，中国代表的缺席使这个协定失去意义（西藏接受的边界的划分缺少中国的认可。）
-------------译者：三变ps-审核者：文所未闻------------
The Simla Agreement was apparently treated as an aspirational document and was recorded in the most authoritative compendium of British Indian treaties, Sir Charles Umpherston Aitchison’s Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads, with the notation that neither Great Britain nor China had ratified the treaty. Since Tibet wasn’t recognized as a sovereign power, whatever it hoped to achieve with the Simla Accord—and what it had tried to give away, namely Tawang– was, in the eyes of the British, moot.
西姆拉协定貌似是一个雄心勃勃的协定并且会被收录在最权威的英属印度条约纲要—Charles Umpherston Aitchison先生的关于协议，契约，法令的收集—中。但是 Aitchison先生批注道：中英都没有批准这个协议。既然西藏不是一个主权国家，那么无论西藏企图从西姆拉协议中得到什么以及它在协议中割让的达旺地区，在英国看来都是无效的。
Things puttered along until 1935, when the detention of a British spy in Tawang by Tibetan authorities awakened the cupidity of a diplomat in the Foreign Office of British India, Olaf Caroe. Caroe checked the files, found that Great Britain had no ratified claims on Tawang, and decided to amend and improve the record. He arranged for the relevant original volume of the 1929 Aitchison compendium to be withdrawn from the various libraries in which it was filed, discarded, and replaced with a new version—but one that still claimed to be compiled in 1929, thereby removing the need for awkward explanations or documentation concerning why the switch had happened. The spurious version claimed that Tibet and Britain had accepted the treaty.
事情就这样直到1935年，西藏方面在达旺拘留了一名英国的间谍，这激起了一名英属印度外交官Olaf Caroe的贪欲。Olaf Caroe查阅了文件但是发现英国对于达旺地区并不拥有主权，于是他决定篡改纪录文件。他安排撤回与此相关的在各个图书馆里的1929年版的Aitchison纲要，这些文件都被归档或者丢弃，取而代之的是新版本的纲要，但是仍然宣称是1929年编译的。因此毁灭了解释这些交易(西姆拉协定)为什么会发生的相关文件，英国也不必为此解释了。伪造的版本宣称西藏和英国接受了西姆拉协定。
-------------译者：三变ps-审核者：文所未闻------------
The deception was only discovered in 1964, when a researcher was able to compare one of the last three surviving copies of the original compendium, at Harvard University, with the spurious replacement. Unfortunately, that was too late for Nehru, who staked his security strategy and his diplomatic exchanges with China to a significant extent on the fallacy that he had inherited from British India a clear and unequivocal claim to its borders.
1964年一名研究者将哈佛大学保存的最后三份1929年原版纲要中的一份与伪造版本的对比时才发现了这个弥天大谎。但不幸的是，这对于尼赫鲁来说为时已晚，因为他的安全和外交政策很大的程度上都建立在错误的基础上—他从英属印度接手的领土是明确没有争议的。
In 1962 Nehru decided to move up military units to assert India’s claim to territory in Ladakh/Aksai Chin and up to the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh under a gambit optimistically named The Forward Policy. The PRC begged to differ—and Chairman Mao was itching to stick it to India’s patron, Nikita Khrushchev–and attacked. India’s entire strategy had been predicated on the assumption that the PRC would not respond (shades, I think, of Western confidence that Vladimir Putin would stay his hand in eastern Ukraine out of fear of sanctions and the wrath of his impoverished and disgruntled oligarchs) and the Indian Army, outnumbered, undersupplied, and disorganized, was completely unprepared to fight for the high ground in the north.
1962年尼赫鲁乐观地提出了前进政策，他决定升级军事据点来强化自己对拉达克/阿克赛钦地区的主权宣示并且将据点推进到了阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区的麦克马洪线。中国发起了攻击但其实也是另有所图，毛 一直想给印度的保护人赫鲁晓夫一点颜色看看。印度的增个计划都是建立在中国不会对此作出反应的基础上的（从这可以看出现在俄罗斯与西方对抗的影子。西方一直以为普京由于害怕制裁和得罪因受损失而不满的金融寡头而不会插手乌克兰东部事务）并且印军寡不敌众，装备差又缺乏组织，根本没有准备好在北部高原作战。
-------------译者：三变ps-审核者：文所未闻------------
India suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the PLA. After its victory, the PRC decided to take the high ground, diplomatically as well as geographically. It withdrew its forces to behind the McMahon Line and offered a swap of AP for AC. No dice, as we have seen. India clearly does not see any need to credit AP—territory that the PRC abandoned—as any kind of bargaining chip concerning Aksai Chin. This is, perhaps, a cautionary tale to the PRC as to the geostrategic minuses as well as pluses of trying to behave like Mr. Nice Guy.
印度耻辱性的惨败在中国人民解放军手中。中国在胜仗之后决定在政治上和地理上控制这片高地。中方主动将军队撤到麦克马洪线之后并且提出印方用阿鲁纳恰尔邦来交换阿克赛钦地区。但是正如我们看到的，这个提议并没有被采纳。印度丝毫没有把阿鲁纳恰尔邦这片中国放弃的领土作为关于阿克赛钦地区的谈判筹码的意思。这个事情对于中国来说是一个教训，让中国知道了做好好先生要付出的代价。
This history is officially persona non grata in India. The report the Indian government commissioned on the 1962 war—the Henderson Brooks Report–was so devastating to India’s position and its legal, military, and diplomatic pretensions it was promptly banned and publication is forbidden to this day. In an ironic recapitulation of the case of the Atchison compendium, it was assumed that there were only two typewritten copies and they were securely buttoned up in safes in New Delhi. However, the Times of London correspondent, Neville Maxwell, got his hands on a copy and used it to write an expose on the tragedy of errors in 1962, India’s China War, thereby earning himself the fierce hatred of generations of Indian nationalists.
这段历史在印度是不为人所知的。印度政府曾授权发表的关于1962年中印之战的《亨德森布鲁克纪实》，由于该纪实对印方的立场是极其不利的，于是印度的军事，外交和法律部门都要求将该报道迅速封杀并且直到现在都没有公开发行。而历史又讽刺性的重演了Atchison纲要事件，一直以来人们都以为世界上仅存的两份打印版布鲁克纪实都被妥善的保管在新德里。但是伦敦时报通讯社的Neville Maxwell得到了一份复制版本并且由此曝光出了印度在1962年战争中策略上的失误，他由此也招来了印度几代国民的极度仇恨。
-------------译者：三变ps-审核者：文所未闻------------
Maxwell tried several times to put the report into the public domain. As quoted in Outlook India, Maxwell provided an interesting account of how the freedom of expression sausage gets made when the information involved is not necessarily a matter of national security (the report is classified Top Secret, but its content—the minutiae of military decisions and movements sixty years ago have no current strategic or tactical significance) but is a matter of supreme political embarrassment (to Nehru, the Congress Party, the Gandhi political dynasty, and to the army).
Neville Maxwell多次想让这份报道进入公有领域（人类一部分作品与知识的总汇），正如《展望印度》中引用的，Maxwell风趣地说到，当一篇报道虽然没有牵扯到国土安全（这份报道被列为绝密，但是它的内容—60年前的军队决策和部署，并没有策略上或者政治上的必要划为绝密文件），但却可能揭露巨大的政治丑闻（针对尼赫鲁，甘地的政治王朝，军队）的时候，言论自由便成了一纸空文。
我觉得在这里它可以单纯的被用于学术。图书馆刚开始对此很欢迎并将其作为珍品并被划分在发案与印刷作品之间的“灰色区域”。所以我便提前把东西给了他们。但是几个月之后，我委托的那位图书馆工作人员提醒我道，由于一项新的规定，在这篇报道出版或者公开之前必须交由英国政府审查而政府对这篇报道好像并不喜欢。博德利图书馆竟然消极的加入了这项秘密的审查，这让我很是震惊，我向馆长，当时还是个美国人，提出了抗议，但并没有收到答复。虽然当时博德利图书馆程序上已经通知了伦敦的印度高级委员会并且可能交出这份报道，但幸运的是我在此之前取回了我的捐赠品。
2002年我发现所有的让印度政府公开这份报道的尝试都失败了之后，便决定要用更直接的方式。我找到了印度最知名的三家出版社并且告诉他们希望他们能够遵守新闻工作者的基本原则。。。。但是令人吃惊的是三家出版社的编辑都不约而同地决定拒绝出版。。。。之后我又找了第四家，第五家，结果都失败了。
莫迪这个国大党和甘地的死敌（当我读到那些关于奥巴马和莫迪由于共同的对甘地的好感会结盟的阿谀奉承的报道时，便会呵呵一笑。他们压根就忽略了一个尴尬的事实，莫迪德人民民族党正是刺杀甘地的刺客的精神家园）执政之后曾说过要公开这篇报道但是却没有。但当Maxwell在他的网站上公开这篇报道的部分内容时，网址便被象征性的封了。
印度军队尤其渴望编造一个虚假的中国方面背信弃义(关于1962年战争)的故事,这比他们承认中国人民解放军的进攻((不是自卫)是由于印度领导人政治上的不断误判而导致印度的边境计划在外交和政策上均遭惨败所引发的或者承认他们惨败在解放军的手里要光彩得多.
2005年中印就边界问题开始谈判,这里摘录了<每日邮报>上的一篇精彩的评论.有迹象表明2013年中印谈判将涉及阿克赛钦地区但不会讨论达旺,并且不幸的是也不会涉及到极其重要并且十分复杂的Caroe伪造纲要的事件。
-------------译者：三变ps-审核者：文所未闻------------
标签： 外国历史故事
